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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PRE-GAME WARM UP SKATE

The New Jersey Devils stressed the team over the individual
and won three Stanley Cups in eight years. 1 Resulting in some success, the National Hockey League ("NHL") emphasizes collective
bargaining with the National Hockey League Players Association
("NHLPA") over individual bargaining with a player. 2 Generally,
1. See Tom Bartunek, Essay; Mystique Keeps Fans in the Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2005, at BIl (noting winning team does not guarantee financial success). The
author observes:
For N.H.L. teams, the measure of success is winning - in general, of
course, but more particularly winning the Stanley Cup, which is most certainly not awarded to the team that makes the most money. The New
Jersey Devils franchise, for example, is one of the most "artistically" successful in hockey, having won three Stanley Cups in the last 10 years. Yet
their attendance is among the lowest in the league, and a year ago,
Forbes magazine estimated that the value of the franchise was actually
declining.
Id.
2. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1979)
(noting National Hockey League ("NHL") by-laws are applicable to players
through Standard Players Contract which both league and NHL Players Association ("NHLPA") expressly approved); see also Helene Elliot, Report: NHL Strikes
Deal, Season Could Begin in Early October, SAN JosE MERcuRy NEWS, July 7, 2005, at 1.
The author notes:
The NHL and the players' association have agreed in principle on a new
collective bargaining agreement that will feature a hard salary cap linked
to 54 percent of league revenue, a 24 percent rollback of existing contracts and qualifying offers, and a provision that will limit the salary of any
player to 20 percent of the team cap figure in any year ....
Id.; see also Joe Lapointe, With Deal Ratified, N.H.L. Becomes a Changed League, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2005, at DI (describing new deal between players and ownership).
The author notes:
The owners voted unanimously yesterday to approve the collective
bargaining agreement, which will limit salaries to a fluctuating range
based on revenue. In the first season, the top team payrolls are tentatively set at $39 million; the minimum will be $21.5 million.
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courts and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") support professional hockey's collective bargaining initiative. 3 The nonstatutory labor exemption ("NLE") prevents the natural conflict
between the NLRA and the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 Similarly, statAlthough Bettman and others referred to the new agreement as an
unprecedented partnership with the players, there was no representation
yesterday from the union. Bill Daly, the executive vice president who was
promoted to deputy commissioner yesterday, said the union was invited
to appear but declined because its leadership was in Toronto to meet
with player agents to inform them of details of the new agreement.
Id. But see Jason Diamos, Around the N.H.L.; Analyzing Union's Agreement, Marvin
Miller Drops the Gloves, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at Al (ascribing to idea that
NHLPA is nothing more than organ for owners). The author reports:
Since the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement last summer, N.H.L. Commissioner Gary Bettman has often referred to a new
partnership between the owners and the players union.
That sort of talk raises the ire of Marvin Miller, the former executive
director of the Major League Baseball Players Association.
"It tells me really what I've known all along," the 88-year-old Miller
said in a telephone interview last week. "And that is that the N.H.L.P.A.
has never been a legitimate union at no time. It has always been an offshoot of management."
Id.
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996) (discussing
how court created exemption from federal labor statutes, which establish national
labor policy in support of collective bargaining between two parties); McCourt, 600
F.2d at 1203 (finding compensation rule that was part of valid agreement between
NHL and NHLPA was result of good faith, arm's-length bargaining).
4. See generally National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(2006). In pertinent part, the NLRA declares:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. The Sherman Act, however, declares illegal every contract or conspiracy in the
restraint of trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005). Therefore, these two federal laws naturally conflict. Compare id., with 29 U.S.C. § 151. In Brown, the court explains how
the judicially created nonstatutory labor exemption ("NLE") supposedly resolves
this conflict:
The implicit ("nonstatutory") exemption interprets the labor statutes in
accordance with this intent, namely, as limiting an antitrust court's authority to determine, in the area of industrial conflict, what is or is not a
,reasonable' practice. It thereby substitutes legislative and administrative
labor-related determinations for judicial antitrust-related determinations
as to the appropriate legal limits of industrial conflict.
Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-37 (citing Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 70910 (1965)). For a further discussion of the NLE and the conflict between federal
antitrust law and labor law, see infra notes 66-107 and accompanying text.
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utory and case law stress this collective bargaining teamwork
5
concept.
This Note examines the inherent conflict between the Sherman Antitrust Act and the NLRA in the context of the NHL's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") and the Ontario Hockey
League's ("OHL") rules.6 First, this Note discusses whether the per
se rule or rule of reason correctly analyzes antitrust litigation in the
professional sports leagues context. 7 Second, this Note looks at
Sherman Act cases in the professional sports context, as well as the
tumultuous history of the NLE. 8 Third, this Note discusses whether
the Sherman Act's NLE applies to this case; if it does, the NHLPA is
out of luck. 9 Finally, this Note explores 1) whether the NHL's CBA
or the OHL's "Van Ryn Rule," which limits a certain class of player's
entry into the NHL, causes these alleged injuries; and 2) how the
two leagues' conspiring activities color this discussion. 10
5. See, e.g., Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 141-42 (2nd Cir. 2004) (Clarett fl)
(asserting that Plaintiff would damage fundamentals of federal labor policy if he
successfully challenged National Football League's ("NFL") draft entry rule); 29
U.S.C. § 151 ("Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption ....").
6. See Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club,
419 F.3d 462, 466-67 (6th Cir. 2005) (NHLPA 11) (explaining NHL and NHLPA
collectively bargain to reach their governing rules). Justice Breyer observed: "I
was brought up at my mother's knee to believe that antitrust and labor law do not
mix." Jeffrey L. Kessler & David G. Feher, What Justice Breyer Could Not Know at his
Mother's Knee: The Adverse Effect of Brown v. Pro Football on Labor Relations in Professional Sports, 14 SPG AN-rrRusT 41, 41 (2000) (quoting Justice Breyer).
7. For a further discussion of the per se rule and the rule of reason, see infra
notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of Sherman Act cases in the professional sports
context and the history of the NLE, see infra notes 66-107 and accompanying text.
9. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975)) ("[T]he implicit exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take
place, some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process
must be shielded from antitrust sanctions."); see also Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 135 (noting that policy not expressly included in CBA, but merely discussed by players'
union and league, precludes perspective employee from bringing antitrust suit because it would undermine federal labor policy); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 61516 (8th Cir. 1976) (espousing three-part test results precluded applying NLE to
case involving dispute over NFL rule owners unilaterally imposed on players because it was not result of fair collective bargaining). For a further discussion on
the NLE's applicability to NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, see infra notes
108-44 and accompanying text.
10. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 474-75 (denoting NHL's CBA, not OHL's "Van
Ryn Rule," caused injury to competition, thus subjecting NHL to NLE). The court
further held that, when viewing the facts in a light favorable to the plaintiffs, there
were enough facts to show a viable conspiracy between the OHL and NHL. See id.
at 475-76 (overruling district court's holding). For a further discussion of the pa-
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FACTS: THE OPENING FACE-OFF

The NHLPA is an unincorporated labor union and is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for all NHL players.11
The NHLPA and plaintiffs Aquino and Caron brought suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on March 12,
2001.12 They alleged that the OHL conspired with the NHL to violate the Sherman Act by illegally barring twenty-year-old United
States college hockey players from participating in the OHL.13 The
district court ruled for the plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction. 14 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
5
remanded, after which the district court dismissed the action.'
16
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.
The collective bargaining agreement between the NHL and
the NHLPA expired in September 2004, and the two parties did not
agree to a new CBA until July 2005.17 Before and during these diffirameters and history of the OHL's "Van Ryn Rule," see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
11. See NHLPA I, 419 F.3d at 468 (describing NHLPA's qualifications). The
NHLPA's popularity recently decreased because the recent strike upset fans, and
players felt betrayed by the new collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). See
Dave Caldwell, Hockey; N.H.L. and PlayersReach Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005,
at D1 (explaining fans' and players' anger over protracted strike).
12. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 468 (noting posture of case). Early issues in the
case revolved around whether the province of Ontario was an adequate alternative
forum, whether the NHLPA had standing to sue, and whether the court had personal jurisdiction over the league. See Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club (NHLPA Ill), 166 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1163-68 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (holding Canada is not adequate alternative forum, NHLPA had
standing to sue, and court had personal jurisdiction over league).
13. See NHLPA I, 419 F.3d at 467-69 (stating plaintiffs' cause of action); see
also Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club (NHLPA
1), 325 F.3d 712, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting qualifications of NHLPA in ongoing labor dispute). For a further discussion of the NHLPA's qualifications, see
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14. See NHLPA I, 419 F.3d at 468 (noting case's procedural history and district court's initial rulings). The district court viewed the NHL's activities as per se
illegal under the Sherman Act. See id. at 469 (acknowledging that Sixth Circuit
applied rule of reason).
15. See id. at 468 (granting defendant's motion to dismiss); NHLPA 1, 325 F.3d
at 721 (finding irreparable harm would not result from reversal of injunction and
plaintiffs failed to establish substantial likelihood of success on merits to warrant
preliminary injunction).
16. See NHLPA I, 419 F.3d at 468 (setting forth procedural history of case).
17. See id. at 467 n.1 (denying "suggestion of mootness" based on expiration
of CBA and loss of 2004-05 NHL season). There was a great deal of animosity
between the NHLPA and the NHL:
The tentative agreement also represented a defeat for the players union,
which accepted a hard salary cap after insisting for months it would not
agree to one. The proposed cap is widely reported to be $39 million for
each of the 30 teams in the league. Players' salaries are not expected to
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cult negotiations for a new CBA, the NHLPA, as a plaintiff in the
action, supported Aquino and Caron in their case against the NHL
and OHL's "Van Ryn Rule."1 8
The OHL has twenty teams, with players between the ages of
sixteen and twenty. 19 Each OHL team can carry only three twentyyear-old players. 20 Under OHL Rule 7.4, i.e., the "Van Ryn Rule,"
an OHL team cannot sign a twenty-year-old unless the player was a
member of a Canadian Hockey Association or had a USA Hockey
Player's Registration the previous season.2 1 The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") prohibits hockey players
holding either type of registration from playing at an NCAA
exceed more than 54 percent of league-wide revenue. When Bettman
called for the lockout last Sept. 16, the players union was steadfast in
saying it would accept neither a cap nor salaries based on revenue. Goodenow has been criticized by his rank and file for caving in on both issues.
Caldwell, supra note 11. See generally Elliot, supra note 2 (explaining new deal be-

tween union and owners).
18. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467-68 (naming plaintiffs NHLPA, Aquino, and
Caron in litigation).
19. See id. at 466 (explaining that two OHL teams are based in Michigan, one
is in Pennsylvania, and seventeen teams are based in Ontario, Canada). The OHL,
the Western Hockey League, and the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League "form
the 'Major Junior Leagues' of the Canadian Hockey League." Id. Other major
sources include European leagues, American colleges, and American high schools.
See id. (listing alternative sources for young players).
20. See id. (announcing that another term for twenty-year-old OHL players is
.overage" players).
21. See id. at 466-67 (explaining parameters of "Van Ryn Rule"). The "Van
Ryn Rule's" actual text states, "[i]t should be understood that to sign and register
an overage player, such player must have been on a CHA or USA Hockey Player's
Registration Certificate in the previous season." NHLPA III, 166 F.Supp. 2d at 1157
n.3. Mike Van Ryn was a University of Michigan hockey player when the NHL's
NewJersey Devils drafted him in 1998. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 466. The Devils,
according to the NHL's CBA, would have Van Ryn's rights for one year. See id. at
466-67. If the Devils did not sign Van Ryn after that period, he would become an
unrestricted free agent who could sign with any other NHL team. See id. at 467.
Under the CBA, those rights only extended past one year if Van Ryn stayed in
NCAA competition or left for a non-affiliated hockey league. See id. Van Ryn remained at the University of Michigan for one year after the draft, thereby extending the Devils' rights to him for one year. See id. He then signed with an OHL
club. See id. Because the OHL is affiliated with the NHL, Van Ryn's signing with
an OHL club did not extend the Devils' rights to Van Ryn. See id. If Van Ryn had
played in an unaffiliated league during that year which Devils had exclusive control over him, he would have had to skip the entire season to become eligible for
free agency. See id. The Devils, supported by the NHL, tried to characterize Van
Ryn a "defected player" ineligible for free agency. See id. An arbitrator rejected
this effort. See id. Van Ryn became an unrestricted free agent in 2000 and signed
with the NHL's St. Louis Blues. See id. The OHL created the "Van Ryn Rule"
about two months after the arbitration decision and Van Ryn's signing with the
Blues. See id.
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school. 22 Together, these two rules prevent OHL teams from sign23
ing any twenty-year-old NCAA players.
Plaintiffs Anthony Aquino and Edward Caron were twenty-yearold NCAA hockey players hoping to compete in the NHL.2 4 Both

contended that the OHL's "Van Ryn Rule" prevented them from
becoming unrestricted NHL free agents and from fully realizing
25
free agency's financial rewards.
The OHL's Owen Sound Attack drafted Aquino at age sixteen,
but instead of playing for Owen, he played three seasons for Merrimack College. 2 6 In June 2001, the NHL's Dallas Stars drafted
Aquino. 27 Aquino thought he had two options for an NHL career:
sign with Dallas and become a restricted free agent for the next
eleven years, orjoin the OHL for one year as an overage player and
become an NHL free agent in 2003.28 The "Van Ryn Rule" prevented him from playing in the OHL.2 9 Aquino believed the OHL
22. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 466 (denoting NCAA's ancillary role in this
litigation). The plaintiffs did not implicate the NCAA in this suit, despite the fact
that their rules, combined with the OHL's and NHL's rules, restrained the plaintiffs from playing in the NHL. See id. For a further discussion of this complex
issue, see infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
23. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 466-67 (explaining effects of rules). The court
explained:
These two rules - the OHL rule requiring overage players to have a [sic]
been on a CHA or USA Hockey Registration, and the NCAA rule barring
players with either of those registrations - combine to prevent OHL teams
from signing any twenty-year-old NCAA players, because such a player
would not have been permitted by the NCAA to have obtained the registration required by the OHL of twenty-year-old players.
Id.
24. See id. at 467 (describing two plaintiffs' situations).
25. See id. at 467-68 (explaining injury to competition "Van Ryn Rule" caused).
"'The NHL sought to close off this avenue to unrestricted free agency and greater
bargaining power by persuading defendants to refuse to sign 20-year-old U.S. college players,' the suit said." Cecil Angel, NHLPA Sues Over OHL Rule, DETROIT FREE
PREss, Mar. 14, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.freep.com/sports/hockey/
suitl4_20010314.htm.
26. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467 (espousing Aquino's position).
27. See id. at 467-68 (explaining Aquino's available professional hockey
options).
28. See Louis Guth, NERA Economist's Role in National Hockey League Players' Association and Anthony Aquino v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club et al., http://
www.NERA.com/image/6002.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (noting how expert
testimony helped defeat player's claims). Aquino believed the OHL was his only
route to becoming an unrestricted free agent. See id. If he joined a professional
league other than the NHL or the CHL, he would fall into "defected" status, causing Dallas to hold Aquino's rights indefinitely. See id. He ultimately signed with
the NHL's Atlanta Thrashers. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 468. Caron argues that he
wanted to play in the OHL in 2002-03 and that he would have signed with an OHL
team but for the "Van Ryn Rule." See id.
29. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467-68 (referencing "Van Ryn Rule's" effect).
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was his only route to becoming an unrestricted free agent. 30 If he
joined a professional league other than the NHL or the CHL, he
31
would fall into "defected" status.
The plaintiffs regarded the rule as an attempt to prevent
NCAA players from achieving free agency via the route Mike Van
Ryn traveled.3 2 The defendants argued that the NHL's CBA, not
the "Van Ryn Rule," caused these effects. 3 3 The Court of Appeals
34
ruled for the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs' case.

III.

BACKGROUND:

POWER PLAY

In antitrust cases, courts analyze a plaintiffs claim with either
the rule of reason or the per se rule. 35 The rule of reason analysis

requires courts to balance a practice's pro- and anti-competitive ef36
fects to determine whether such effects violate the Sherman Act.
The court applies the per se rule when the contested practice is so
30. See id. at 467 (discussing plaintiffs desire to play in OHL).
31. See Guth, supra note 28 (denoting "Van Ryn Rule's" effect).
32. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467 (stating plaintiffs argument that rule restricted amateur hockey players' options). For a further discussion of Mike Van
Ryn's actions, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
33. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467 (arguing that rule similar to "Van Ryn
Rule," "which prevented overage players from playing in OHL if they had not
played there as nineteen-year-olds, was in effect from 1992 to 1998 .... " and that
NHL's CBA sets forth rules governing free agent eligibility); see also Guth, supra
note 28 (explaining expert's opinion of "Van Ryn Rule"). To determine if the
"Van Ryn Rule" represented an unlawful restraint of trade, the OHL's counsel
retained Louis Guth, an antitrust and regulation expert. See Guth, supra note 28.
Mr. Guth analyzed "data relating to intercollegiate, developmental league and professional ice hockey games and markets." Id. Mr. Guth testified that twenty-yearold U.S. college hockey players have five options other than playing in the NHL,
including joining a variety of different professional leagues, playing in one of two
Canadian "Major Junior" amateur leagues other than the OHL, or remaining in
school. See id. Mr. Guth found the NHLPA's objection to the OHL's Overage
Player Rule merely criticized one of the five other options. See id.
34. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 474 (stating that NHL's CBA, not "Van Ryn
Rule," caused plaintiffs injury). The court noted:
We would draw this conclusion under even the most lenient proximate
cause standard. Ultimately, we draw this conclusion because common
sense requires it. Only indefensibly circuitous logic would blame the
rules governing who can play in the OHL, and not the rules governing
who can become an NHL free agent, for preventing players from achieving free agency in the NHL.
Id. at 475.
35. See, e.g.,
id. at 469 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 98 (1984)) ("Because every contract could be construed as a restraint of
trade, the Supreme Court has held that for a claim to be actionable under the
Sherman Act, the restraint challenged must be 'unreasonable.'").
36. See 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraint of Trade § 6 (2005) (explaining
rule of reason).
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anticompetitive that a court's rule of reason analysis would be
37
futile.
A.

The Rule of Reason

The rule of reason asks whether the challenged agreement encourages or stifles competition.3 8 It also examines the totality of
the circumstances of the alleged agreement. 39 This gives the Sher40
man Act more power, flexibility, and defined limits.
Under a rule of reason analysis, judges engage in protracted
factual examinations and make policy-based, legislative-like decisions. 4 1 Hence, the rule of reason usually requires six elements:
(1) discovery of the facts of the particular business; (2) the busi37. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Per se treatment of
trade restraint is appropriate '[o] nce experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables the Court to predict with confidence that rule of reason will condemn it."'
(quoting Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 334 (1982))). The per
se rule usually applies to group boycotts or refusals to deal with a specific group.
See White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1963). This case is a group
boycott because both the NHL and OHL refuse to deal with a certain group. See
NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 469-70. But see Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348
(1963) (giving exception to per se illegality of group boycotts by examining
whether industry structure requires collective action, whether restraint is reasonably implemented and whether procedural safeguards, namely notice and hearing,
are in place to prevent arbitrary application); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. at 100-01 (postulating that rule of reason, not per se rule, often applies to
professional sports because horizontal restraints are necessary for sporting business to thrive).
-

38. See Peter Altman, Stay Out for Three Years After High School or Play in Canada

and for Good Reason: An Antitrust Look at Clarett v. National Football League, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 569, 579 (2004-05) (dictating baseline investigation for rule of reason inquiry). Courts continue to look at the "unique qualities of the business, and
the extent, rationale, and effects of the restraint." Id.
39. See William Meade Fletcher, Monopolies and Unfair Competition: Contracts,

Combinations and Agreements in Restraint of Trade, 1OA FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. § 4982 (2006) (adding that proven harm does not necessarily indicate
Sherman Act violation). The author writes:
Before the courts will condemn a particular agreement, one of the following must be present: the elements of injury to the public, or monopolistic
control of a particular article of commerce, or unreasonable interference
with and damage to the business of an individual, or the doing of illegal
or unconscionable acts, or specific intent to do injury to someone else, or
at least some of those circumstances which would lead a court in good
conscience to say that a given set of defendants was overstepping the
bounds of reasonable ambition and fair play, and was becoming a
nuisance.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. See Altman, supra note 38, at 579 (noting rule of reason analysis depends
on both competitive impact and economic analysis of situation).
41. SeeJohn R. Gerba, Instant Replay: A Review of the Case of Maurice Clarett, the
Application of the Non-Statutory LaborExemption, and its Protection of the NFL DraftEligibility Rule, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2383, 2390-91 (2005) (examining potential practical negative effects of rule of reason in antitrust cases in general). Determining

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol14/iss1/1

8

Brophy: Icing the Competition: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption and the C

2007]

NHLPA v. PLYMOUTH WHALERS HocKEY CLUB

9

ness's condition before and after the restraint was imposed; (3) the
nature of the restraint and its effect; (4) the restraint's history and
the evil thought to exist; (5) the reason behind adopting the particular restraint; and (6) the purpose or end sought to be attained by
the restraint. 42 The rule of reason often requires such complex calculations that the cost of doing those computations may outweigh
43
any benefit.
B.

The Per Se Rule

Courts reserve the per se rule for "naked restraints of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition. ' 44 The per se treatment is appropriate when an experienced court can predict that
the rule of reason will condemn a certain practice. 45 The per se
rule paints in broad strokes, while the rule of reason deals with de46
tailed, case sensitive inquiries.
Courts historically invoked the per se rule in "group boycott"
47
cases, in which one group refused to deal with another group.
More recent precedent, however, has changed that particular
trend.48
reasonableness questions under the Sherman Act involves questions of both relation and degree. See id.
42. See 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraint of Trade § 48 (2005) (relaying
importance of restraint's intent when determining if antitrust laws violated).
43. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that
in certain circumstances, such as price fixing, per se rule avoids need for long,
complicated, and often wholly futile investigation into entire history of industry
implicated).
44. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
45. See, e.g., Lawv. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing
per se rule as judicial shortcut around sometimes cumbersome rule of reason
inquiry).
46. See Altman, supra note 38, at 579-80 (noting that courts historically favored using per se rule in antitrust cases dealing with professional sports).
47. See, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1063
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that draft rule which precluded certain class of players
constituted per se violation). Spencer Haywood successfully challenged professional basketball's rule prohibiting a player from negotiating with a team unless he
is four years removed from high school. See id. at 1066-67. The court found this to
be a group boycott and a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See id.
48. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01
(1984) (dictating that per se rule does not apply to horizontal trade restraints in
professional sports context but instead must be examined under rule of reason
analysis). The Court, in dicta, acknowledges that sports leagues, notably the
NCAA, needed horizontal restraints inorder to survive. See id. In this sense, the
antitrust analysis needed to be premised on unreasonableness, and it is therefore
not logical to view it as a per se violation. See id.
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The Per Se Rule v. The Rule of Reason

In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court refused to apply the per se approach. 49 The NCAA
imposed a horizontal restraint of trade, which traditionally invoked
the per se rule. 50 The Court, nevertheless, rejected the per se approach in favor of the rule of reason because college football needs
51
certain trade restraints for the product's availability.
Thus, courts adopt a rule of reason standard when dealing with
trade restraints in the professional sports context because of professional sports' uniqueness - horizontal restraints are necessary to effectuate successful and organized leagues. 52 Simply because a court
adopts the rule of reason standard does not guarantee that there
53
will be no Sherman Act violation.
D.

The Sherman Act, NLRA, and NLE

Antitrust law's theory rests on the idea that monopolizing the
product market, thus limiting competition, unfairly injures a capitalistic economy.5 4 In contrast, labor law strives to have employees
49. See id. at 100-01 (using rule of reason to hold that NCAA television plan
was unreasonable because it restricted, rather than enhanced, competition).
50. See id. at 100. The Court defined a horizontal restraint as "an agreement
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another." Id.
at 99. The group boycott at issue in this case is a type of horizontal restraint. See
NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 469.
51. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101-02 ("[T]he NCAA
plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a
result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.").
The Court also espoused the view that these restrictions enhanced, rather than
diminished, competition. See id. at 101. For a further discussion of Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla., see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
52. See Scott A. Freedman, Comment, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The
Second Circuit's Blanket Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett v.
NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 155, 160-63 (2004). The author writes:
While there is some support that the per se approach is now a dead letter
altogether, at least one scholar has concluded that the reluctance of the
courts to apply a per se approach in the antitrust context is simply part of
a larger judicial trend away from such out-of-hand rejections.
Id. at 160-61; see also Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without
Balancing,35 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 704-05 (1986) (discussing inherent clash between
labor and antitrust law). For a further discussion of this issue, see supranotes 47-51
and accompanying text.
53. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 132-33 (holding, under rule
of reason, NCAA television plan unreasonable because it restricted, rather than
enhanced, competition).
54. See Bryan A. Wood, Antitrust Law - Supreme Court Drops the Ball: Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996), Highlights the Need to Return Labor's Antitrust Exemption to its Statutory Origin, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 321, 321-22 (1997) ("The
inevitable debate has resulted in a confusing body of case law and congressional
enactments that have attempted to harmonize the conflicting policies.").
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work together and collectively bargain to eliminate competition in
the labor market. 55 Hence, antitrust law and labor law disputes present courts with an interesting dichotomy. 56 The NLE attempts to

57
mediate the dispute between these two contrasting bodies of law.
The Sherman Act prohibits contracts or combinations that unreasonably restrain trade. 58 Before courts will condemn a particular agreement as violating section one of the Sherman Act, one of
the following must be present: (1) injury to the public, unreasonable interference with and damage to an individual's business; (2)
the doing of illegal or unconscionable acts and specific intent to do
injury to someone else; (3) or at least a circumstance which would
lead courts to say that a set of defendants overstepped the bounds
59
of reasonable ambition and fair play.

55. See id. at 331-32. The writer notes:

In 1947, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act. Congress intended the Act to aid and encourage the collective bargaining
process in order to induce the free flow of commerce. To effectuate this
policy, the Act made wages and working conditions a mandatory subject
of the collective bargaining process. In light of the well-reasoned parameters of the statutory labor exemption to the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court thereafter began to infer that agreements between employers and
employees concerning terms and conditions of employment implicitly
were exempt from antitrust liability.
Id.
56. See Kessler & Feher, supra note 6, at 41 (explaining antitrust and labor
laws conflict in professional sports). "[P]rofessional sports has'enjoyed long periods of labor stability and peace only when the employees in this industry were able
to exercise their rights under both the antitrust laws and the labor laws." Id. at 42.
57. See Freedman, supra note 52, at 164-65 (noting NLE is limited exemption
that should only be granted when doing so would be in furtherance of policies
underlying its application).
58. The applicable subsection of the Sherman Act reads:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
59. See Fletcher, supra note 39 (denoting factors necessary to find violation of
antitrust laws). "Unreasonableness can be based on either (1) the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance
prices." Id. The rule of reason normally requires looking at: (1) a particular business' facts; (2) its condition before and after the restraint's imposition; (3) the
restraint's character and its actual or probable effect; (4) the restraint's history and
the evil believed to exist; (5) the reason for adopting the particular restraint; and
(6) the purpose sought to be attained by the restraint. See id.
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The NLRA's purpose is to have employees collectively bargain
with their employers on mandatory subjects. 60 The mandatory bargaining subjects are "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions

of employment. '6 1 Moreover, the NLRA defines employees and
employers and denotes that employers must bargain in good faith
62
with certified unions.
The NLE is not easily defined. 63 The Supreme Court has never
explicitly defined the NLE's limits. 64 Instead, the Court has prima65
rily used the NLE through a policy-based, loose analysis.
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (asserting goal of national labor policy).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (setting out what employers and employees are
required to bargain over in collective bargaining situation).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (providing Congress's definition of employer
and employee). The statute reads:
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States
or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve
Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject
to the Railway Labor Act [sic], as amended from time to time, or any
labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone
acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not
be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not
obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status
of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway
Labor Act [sic], as amended from time to time, or by any other person
who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3).
63. SeeJonathan C. Tyras, Comment, Players Versus Owners: Collective Bargaining and Antitrust After Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 297,
318 (1998). The author avers:
The Supreme Court has denied the applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption to collectively bargained agreements that involve or impact groups that are not a party to the specific agreement, yet has applied
the exemption when the agreement affects only the parties to it and is the
result of good-faith, arm's-length bargaining.
Id. at 318-19 (citations omitted).
64. See id. 319-25 (denoting NLE's checkered history); see also Brown v. Pro
Football, 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996) (reviewing NLE's scope).
65. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 24243 (asserting that subjecting unilateral imposition of terms to antitrust law would introduce instability and uncertainty into collective-bargaining process because antitrust often forbids or discourages joint
discussions and behavior that collective bargaining requires). But see Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) (creating test rather than policy to determine whether action deserves antitrust exemption).
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The Relevant Case Law of the NLE as Applied to the
Sherman Act and the NLRA

To effectuate collective bargaining in light of antitrust law's
promotion of free marketplace competition, courts allow certain
CBAs a limited NLE from antitrust penalties. 66 Because antitrust
law aims to promote competition and discourage collective behavior, while labor law aims to use collective activity to protect workers'
rights, a fundamental tension exists between antitrust and labor
law. 6 7 The history and precedent set by cases in this area of the law
68
exemplifies the tension that the NLE is meant to alleviate.

1.

Jewel Tea and Connell Construction
In Local Union Number 189 v. Jewel Tea Company, Inc., the opera-

tor of a chain of retail grocery stores in the Chicago area sued the
labor unions and the association of food retailers representing independent food stores. 69 The Jewel Tea Court required that the
agreement's subject matter be "intimately related to wages, hours
and working conditions." 70 The "intimately related" test provided
66. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975) (espousing "follow naturally" test in its holding that NLE
was inapplicable). The Court opined:
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over
wages and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and
standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this
effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.
The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on differences in
wages and working conditions.
Id. at 622.
67. See Tyras, supra note 63, at 318 (denoting that NLE was created to reconcile differences between two competing doctrines); see also Connell Constr. Co., 421
U.S. at 626 ("The Federal policy favoring collective bargaining . . .can offer no
shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell or its campaign to exclude
nonunion firms from the subcontracting market."); Local Union No. 189, et al. v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965) (applying NLE because dispute involved non-union group and included good-faith, arm's-length bargaining);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) ("One
group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry
and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy."); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945) ("Congress never intended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid
non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of
goods and services.").
68. For a further discussion of the NLE's history, see infra notes 69-100 and
accompanying text.
69. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679 (setting out factual background of case).
70. Id. at 689. The Court further explained:
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that the parties' CBA is exempt from antitrust law if the agreement:
1) concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; 2) affects
only the parties under the agreement; and 3) stems from bona fide,
71
arm's-length negotiating between the parties.
In Connell Construction Company v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union Number 100, the Court held that the NLE did not apply to a
union-employer agreement where agreed upon terms unrelated to

the mandatory bargaining subjects acted as market restraints on
parties outside the agreement. 72 Instead, the agreement was not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny because: (1) the parties negotiated it
outside the collective bargaining context; (2) it directly restrained
trade with substantial anticompetitive effects; and (3) its effects did
not "follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
73
wages and working conditions.
2.

The Mackey Test

In Mackey v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit considered the NFL's unilateral imposition of a trade restraint on its players union.7 4 The
court held this illegally restricted trade because the CBA "was not
the product of bona fide arm's-length negotiations." 75 The court
noted a CBA allows parties to restrain trade to a greater degree
than management unilaterally could. 76 The court also found the
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours
and working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that
provision through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their
own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with
nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor policy
and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. We think that it is.
Id. at 689-90.
71. See Tyras, supra note 63, at 319 (discussing Mackey test). This test encourages collective bargaining by generally exempting those efforts from a court's antitrust scrutiny. See id. at 315. Nonetheless, the exemption does not shield all
collective bargaining efforts from antitrust scrutiny. See id. at 320.
72. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 619-21 (denoting facts and Court's holding in NLE case).
73. Id. at 625. This "test attempts to accommodate federal labor policy's need
for a degree of reduced competition by prohibiting only those provisions whose
anticompetitive effects would not follow naturally from allowing for that degree of
reduced competition in negotiating wages, hours, and working conditions." Freedman, supra note 52, at 167 (citing Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 625).
74. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) (describing case's
parameters).
75. Id. at 623 (explaining reasoning behind complex holding).
76. See id. (noting implicit tension between employers and unions). The
"benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employer's
chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." Id. at 614 n.12 (quoting U.S. v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
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Rozelle Rule, the alleged means by which the owners restrained
competition, dealt with mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
NLRA. 7 7 Hence, if a collectively bargained labor practice can satisfy
78
the three-part Mackey test, it is exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
The court stated: (1) the restraint must primarily affect only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship; (2) the agreement
must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3)
the agreement must stem from bona fide, arm's-length collective
79
bargaining.
a.

McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.

Mackey produced further precedent in the NLE area.80 In McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., a player sued to enjoin the NHL from
enforcing an arbitration award.81 Adopting the Mackey test, the
court found the compensation rule was part of a valid agreement
between the NHL and the NHLPA, which resulted from good faith,
77. See id. at 615 (espousing that Rozelle Rule fell within NLRA's definition of
mandatory subjects of bargaining). The court explained:
The district court found, however, that the [Rozelle] Rule operates
to restrict a player's ability to move from one team to another and depresses player salaries. There is substantial evidence in the record to support these findings. Accordingly, we hold that the Rozelle Rule
constitutes a mandatory bargaining subject within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
Id.
78. See id. at 616 (finding no bona fide arm's-length bargaining because rule
predated CBA and there was no quid pro quo for its inclusion in CBA).
79. See id. ("The union's acceptance of the status quo by the continuance of
the Rozelle Rule in the initial collective bargaining agreements under the circumstances of this case cannot serve to immunize the Rozelle Rule from the scrutiny of
the Sherman Act."). Nevertheless, only some circuits have applied the Mackey test.
See, e.g., Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply Mackey test
because it was inconsistent with Supreme Court's recent NLE holding).
80. For a further discussion of Mackey and its precedents, see infra notes 82-92
and accompanying text.
81. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1979) (discussing facts of case). An NHL arbitrator ruled that the Detroit Red Wings had to
give up Dale McCourt as compensation for signing goaltender Rogie Vachon of
the Los Angeles Kings. See id. The NHL defended its compensation system by
claiming immunity from antitrust liability through the NLE. See id. at 1196-97.
The district court held the NLE was inapplicable because the agreement did not
satisfy the third prong of the Mackey test, requiring the agreement to come from
bona fide, arm's-length negotiating. See id. at 1197. The evidence proves that the
NHL unilaterally imposed the by-law upon the NHLPA and included it in the CBA
with the exact language it had when the NHL first implemented it. See id. Merely
including the by-law in the CBA did not immunize it from antitrust penalties. See
id.
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arm's-length bargaining.8 2 The court, therefore, protected the rule
from the antitrust laws. 83 McCourt established that hard-line bargaining will not expose a CBA to antitrust liability, even if the CBA's
terms do not benefit the employees.8 4 The district court held the
NLE was inapplicable because the NHL did not satisfy the third
prong of the Mackey test when it bitterly bargained for a system

thrust upon a frail union with limited bargaining power. 85 The
Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the NHL did satisfy the third prong
of the Mackey test; the players bargained against the system and
lost. 8 6

b.

Wood v. NBA

The Second Circuit did not mention the Mackey test in Wood v.
NBA, yet the court nevertheless analyzed the case according to
Mackey's three step test.8

7

The Second Circuit held that Leon

Wood's challenge to the NBA's draft entry rules withstood antitrust
scrutiny.8 8 Wood argued the draft was illegal because it affected
employees outside the bargaining unit.8 9 The court dismissed this
82. See id. at 1201-03 (finding that inclusion of reserve system in CBA was
product of good faith, arm's-length negotiation and implicitly noting that agreements with clearly one-sided terms are not necessarily invalid).
83. See id. at 1203 (expanding Mackey to encompass all parts of CBA, even
obvious lop-sided terms). Courts must examine collectively bargained terms "in
the larger context of the entire agreement." Tyras, supra note 63, at 320. In McCourt, the NHLPA had to concede to By-Law 9A, but in exchange, the union received many concessions from the owners. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1202-03
("[T] he NHL conceded that the NHLPA could terminate the entire agreement if
the NHL merged with the World Hockey Association." (quoting McCourt v. Cal.
Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 911 (D.C. Mich. 1978))).
84. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203 (announcing case's holding); see also Tyras,
supra note 63, at 320 (noting significance of McCourt as limiting Mackey's
application).
85. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1196 (documenting previous holding of case); see
also 25 Am. Jur. 2d § 333 (2005) (stating that there is no real definition of good
faith in labor context, but it should be based on subjective state of mind and peripheral conduct). The court also rejected the NHL's contention that the players
received valid consideration for the inclusion of the system in the CBA. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1196. Considerable evidence demonstrated that the players did
not want this system. See id. Cf Diamos, supra note 2 (explaining how Marvin
Miller believes NHLPA is sham really run by NHL management).
86. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1200 (dismissing players' arguments).
87. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961-63 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining holding
of case). For of further discussion of the court's analysis in Wood, see infra notes
88-92 and accompanying text (explaining court's application of NLE to case's
facts).
88. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 960 (noting reasoning for court's complex holding).

89. See id. (documenting Wood's unique argument); see also Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, ProfessionalFootball'sDraft Eligibility Rule: The Labor
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argument as without precedent. 90 The court noted the NLRA's definition of "employee" includes workers outside the bargaining
unit.9 1 The court also found the entry draft had an intimate rela92
tion to the mandatory subjects of bargaining.
3.

Brown v. Pro Football

The Supreme Court set down a notably relevant precedent in
Brown v. Pro Football.93 In Brown, the NFL and NFL Players AssociaExemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 402-03 (1984). The article
states:
In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the term "employee." ... In the Court's view, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act dictated that the definition of the term "employee" should not be
stretched beyond its plain meaning, which included only those who
worked for another for hire. Further, the Taft-Hartley amendment made
it clear that general agency principles were to be looked to for the purpose of distinguishing between "employees" and independent
contractors.
Other important considerations support the narrow interpretation
of "employee" and the conclusion that college undergraduates, like the
retirees in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, are not "employees" within the meaning
of the Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
90. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 962-63 (distinguishing support Wood used for his
claim by finding support to be converse situation to one facing Wood). "However,
that is also a commonplace consequence of collective agreements. Seniority
clauses may thus prevent outsiders from bidding for particular jobs, and other provisions may regulate the allocation or subcontracting of work to other groups of
workers." Id. at 960 (citing Fireboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,
210-15 (1964)).
91. See id. at 960 (espousing broad interpretation of NLRA definition); see also
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (defining employees). But see Gerba, supra note 41, at
2417. The author explains:
To effectuate the congressional intent for collective bargaining, the
NLRA must cover some potential employees to foster incentives for employers to bargain collectively. The NLRA definition, however, imposes
limits on who should be considered an employee. Including all future
potential employees within this definition would leave the definition of
"employees" virtually limitless. If Congress intended such broad coverage
it would have used the term "person" instead of "employee" when it wrote
the statute.
Id.
92. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 962. The court explained its broad interpretation:
Each of them clearly is intimately related to 'wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.' Indeed, it is precisely because of
their direct relationship to wages and conditions of employment that
such matters are so controversial and so much the focus of bargaining in
professional sports. Wood's claim for damages, for example, is based on
an allegation of lost wages.
Id.
93. See Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 239 (1996) (denoting holding
where Supreme Court found for professional athletes against professional sports
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tion came to a collective bargaining impasse over developmental
squad players' salaries. 94 The NFL unilaterally imposed its salary
proposal after the two sides could not agree. 95 The Supreme Court
in Brown incorporated elements of Jewel Tea and Connell Construction
into its decision. 96 It examined which parties the challenged provision primarily affected, as instructed by Jewel Tea.97 The Court inquired into the anti-competitive nature of the provision, as
mandated by Connell Construction.9 8 The Court only applied the
NLE upon a showing of sufficient collective bargaining efforts between the parties, as per Mackey. 9 9 Because labor and management
tried to agree on a subject unquestionably mandatory to bargaining, the Court declined to step in. 10 0

league in antitrust action). For a further discussion of Brown and its holding, see
infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (elucidating past precedent Brown followed and new precedent Brown created).
94. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 234-35 (explaining facts of case and stance of
parties).
95. See id. at 235 (noting bargaining efforts were made by both sides before
unilateral imposition of developmental squad program occurred when league distributed uniform contracts to clubs).
96. See id. at 235, 237, 242-43, 248, 250 (using cases and providing complex
holding). The Court explained:
Consequently, the question before us is one of determining the exemption's scope: Does it apply to an agreement among several employers
bargaining together to implement after impasse the terms of their last
best good-faith wage offer? We assume that such conduct, as practiced in
this case, is unobjectionable as a matter of labor law and policy. On that
assumption, we conclude that the exemption applies.
Id. at 238; see also Freedman, supra note 52, at 158-63 (referring to other antitrust
litigation cases).
97. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (offering that labor law would be ineffective if
parties to antitrust actions were routinely subject to penalties after engaging in
collective bargaining).
98. See id. (reasoning that federal labor law could not achieve its goals if anticompetitive results of collective bargaining violate antitrust laws).
99. See id. at 236 (providing examples of why, implicitly, NLE should be limited); see also generally Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959); San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-45 (1959); NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).
100. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-37 (finding NLE shielded NFL from antitrust
liability). The NLE applied to the unilateral action of the league because "[i]t
grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining
process. It involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining relationship."
Id. at 250. The Brown court concluded that the NLE, which substituted congressional labor determinations for judicial antitrust determinations, was necessary to
ensure a meaningful collective bargaining process. See id. at 237.
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Clarett v. NFL

Perhaps the most famous recent case considering the NLE involved the Ohio State University's young running back Maurice
Clarett. 10 1 The case focused on his attempt to circumvent the
NFL's draft rules and enter the NFL draft before he was three years
removed from high school. 10 2 Maurice Clarett requested injunctive
relief to allow him to enter the NFL draft. 0 3 The district court
granted him relief.10 4 The Second Circuit, however, framed the issue as "whether subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to antitrust
scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor
policy.' "105 The court relied on Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n
in finding the eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of collective

101. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (Clarett 1) (introducing most notable, recent case addressing NFL rule limiting entry draft eligibility to college players three years after graduation from high
school), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
102. For a further discussion of Clarett and his struggles, see infra notes 10307 and accompanying text.
103. See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (explaining relief Clarett sought).
The court explained the draft rule's history: "It was adopted after Illinois's star
running back, Harold 'Red' Grange, stunned the sports world by leaving school at
the end of the 1925 college season and joining the Chicago Bears of the five-yearold NFL for a reported $50,000." Id. (quoting Charles Lane, Clarett Lines up
Against NFL, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at D1). The former version of the rule
precluded a player from entering the NFL unless four seasons had passed since his
high school graduation; in 1990, the requirement eased to three seasons. See id. at
385.
104. See id. at 379, 382 (noting that he was ready, willing, and able to enter
NFL). The court found that Clarett was outside the bargaining unit and that the
rule was not a product of bona fide, arm's-length bargaining. See id. at 395-96.
Clarett had antitrust standing because his injury directly resulted from the anticompetitive effects of the rule. See id. at 382. The court then applied the "rule of
reason." See id. at 405-06. The court held the eligibility rule was unreasonable
because it was a "naked restraint of trade," had "no legitimate procompetitive justification," and there were "less restrictive alternatives" available to the league. Id. at
406-10. Specifically, the district court found that the rules exclude strangers to the
bargaining relationship from entering the draft, do not concern wages, hours, or
working conditions of current NFL players, and were not the product of bona fide,
arm's-length negotiations. See id. at 391, 395-97.
105. Clarett I, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d
954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987). The court believed that it would damage the fundamentals of federal labor policy to apply antitrust laws. See id.
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bargaining. 10 6 The court ruled in favor of the NFL and against
10 7

Clarett.

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYsis:

POWER PLAY

GOAL

The NHLPA II court wrote the restraint on trade must be unreasonable for an actionable claim under the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 10 8 The court turned to recent horizontal restraint antitrust
precedent to determine whether to apply the per se rule or the rule
of reason. 10 9 Citing this recent precedent, the court demonstrated
that the rule of reason governed this particular case." 0
106. See id. at 139 (citing Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 529
(2d Cir. 1995)) (recognizing that eligibility rules for draft are tailored to unique
circumstance of professional sports league). The Clarett H court explained: "We
found that as a consequence of the collective bargaining relationship between the
ABA and its players union, Caldwell's claims, insofar as they concerned the 'circumstances under which an employer may discharge or refuse to hire an employee,' involved a mandatory bargaining subject." Id. at 137 (citing Caldwell, 66
F.3d at 529). The district court in Clarett I had a different view. See Clarett I, F.
Supp. 2d at 382 ("[T]he [r]ule makes a class of potential players unemployable.
Wages, hours, or working conditions affect only those who are employed or eligible for employment.") (emphasis in original). Thus, the district court found eligibility restrictions were not conditions of employment and therefore could not be
classified as mandatory subjects of bargaining. See id; see also Gerba, supra note 41,
at 2387 (espousing author's definition of conditions of employment). The author
explains:
Conditions of employment are limited to those conditions under which
one has to perform his job. To include eligibility restrictions as a condition of employment would be inconsistent with the NLRA because it extends the coverage of "conditions of employment" beyond just
employees, its elimination does nothing to harm collective bargaining,
and by its very nature can only apply to ineligible potential employees. In
addition, the Second Circuit's support for its holding is limited and
distinguishable.
Id. at 2415-16 (citations omitted).
107. See ClarettII, 369 F.3d at 143 (denoting that Mackey, Eighth Circuit's precedent, did not control). The court explained: "We, however, have never regarded the Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the
nonstatutory exemption." Id. at 133. The court drew the distinction that the
Mackey test drew on Supreme Court precedent based on injury to employers, not
employees like Clarett. See id. at 134.
108. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)) (espousing rule of reason
analysis).
109. See id. (noting per se analysis is correct when practice lacks any competitive basis (quoting Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Bd.
of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99, 101 (holding that, because of unique circumstance of
college football, industry with horizontal restraints is not necessarily per se illegal).
110. See id. (citing Law, 134 F.3d at 1016) (explaining that courts consistently
examine challenged conduct under rule of reason when dealing with industry in
which horizontal restraints are necessary for availability of product); see also
NHLPA 1, 325 F.3d 712, 719 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that since Board of Regents,
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Next, the court examined the two alleged anti-competitive effects of the "Van Ryn Rule."'II The court held that harm to athletic
1 12
competition is not a cognizable harm under the Sherman Act.
The plaintiffs argued the "Van Ryn Rule" makes the market for all
other young professional hockey players in North America less competitive by reducing the quality of players permitted in the labor
pool. 113 The court found this to be an injury to competition under
1 14
the Sherman Act.
The court then addressed whether the "Van Ryn Rule" caused
the anti-competitive injury.1 1 5 While the plaintiffs alleged the "Van
Ryn Rule" closed an available avenue to NHL free agency, 1 16 the
courts consistently hold that rule of reason analysis is appropriate for challenges to
sport eligibility rules).
111. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 469 (explaining that plaintiffs have burden to
prove alleged anti-competitive effects of "Van Ryn Rule").
112. See id. at 473-74 (noting, importantly, that plaintiffs did not allege that
lessened level of athletic competition caused economic harm).
113. See id. at 473-75 (arguing that by eliminating one path to NHL free
agency, and thereby limiting competition between NHL clubs for players' services
and rendering market for NHL players less competitive, affects players' salaries in
relative market because some players who may have achieved free agency in NHL
are unable to do so because of "Van Ryn Rule").
114. See id. at 474 (recognizing that there was injury to competition yet holding OHL's actions did not violate Sherman Act). The court further explained:
In our view, the district court's analysis mischaracterizes Plaintiffs' argument. Plaintiffs contend that the "Van Ryn Rule" eliminates one path to
NHL free agency, thereby limiting the competition between NHL clubs
for these players' services and rendering the market for NHL players,
and, presumably, the market for all other young professional hockey players in North America, less competitive. Such an injury is an injury to
competition within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Id.
115. See id. (explaining how court approached causation analysis).
116. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 473 (denoting argument of plaintiffs against
"Van Ryn Rule"). Aquino claimed that playing for the OHL's Generals was the
only way to become an unrestricted free agent and that, assuming he could join a
professional league other than the NHL or the OHL, he would fall into defected
status, causing the NHL's Dallas Stars to hold his exclusive rights in perpetuity. See
NHLPA 1, 325 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2003). The "Van Ryn Rule" prevented him
from entering the OHL and, in the process, also from becoming a free agent in
the NHL, and this, he argued, unlawfully restricted free market competition. See
id. at 720; see also CBA Between NHL and NHLPA, 2005, available at http://
www.nhlpa.com/CBA/2005CBA.asp [hereinafter NHL CBA]. The CBA defines a
defected player as:
any Player not unconditionally released: (A) who, having had a SPC
[Standard Player's Contract] with a Club, the provisions of which, including the option clauses in a 1995 SPC, have not been completely fulfilled,
contracts for a period including any part of the unfulfilled portion of his
SPC, with a club in a league not affiliated with the NHL or with any such
league (both of which are hereinafter referred to as an "unaffiliated
club") or with any other professional hockey club to the exclusion of the
said Club or its assignee; or (B) who, never having been under contract to
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defendants claimed the NHL's CBA caused the illegal restraint. 117
1 18
The court agreed with the defendants' analysis.
Although this is an injury under the Sherman Act, the court
espoused that the NHL's CBA, not the "Van Ryn Rule," prevented
the players from achieving free agency in the NHL. 119 The court
then noted that "[a]ny anti-competitive effect of a properly bargained collective bargaining agreement is excluded from antitrust
120
scrutiny by a non-statutory antitrust exemption."'
Last but not least, the court held the NHL and OHL conspired
to restrict competition. 21 Nevertheless, because the "Van Ryn
Rule" was not the root cause of the restriction, the plaintiffs had no
cause of action. 122 The court dismissed the case for failure to state
23
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
any Club, but as to who the NHL negotiation rights now or at any time
hereafter shall reside in any Club, has contracted or shall contract with
such an unaffiliated club.
Id. § 10.2(b).
117. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 475-76 (explaining defendants' argument
against plaintiffs' causation theory).
118. See id. at 476 (holding in favor of defendants).
119. See id. at 474 (noting that NHL CBA, not OHL's "Van Ryn Rule," establishes rules governing free agency eligibility in NHL).
120. Id. The court explained its dismissal of the case:
Therefore, if Defendants are correct that the injury complained of by the
NHLPA is actually caused by the CBA, and not the "Van Ryn Rule," then
Plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act. (And
certainly have not stated one against Defendants, who bear no responsibility for the CBA). We agree with Defendants that any anti-competitive
effect caused by a restriction on the means by which players may achieve
free agency in the NHL must be ascribed to the CBA and not the "Van
Ryn Rule," and that Plaintiffs have consequently failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Id.; see also, e.g., Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding CBA precludes antitrust liability).
121. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 475-6 (explaining conspiracy and its implications). The court reasoned: "[T]he OHL has admitted that the Van Ryn Rule
negatively impacts player quality, because it prevents OHL Clubs from signing talented twenty-year-old NCAA players .... We find it not only reasonable but self-

evident that better players provide a better product." Id. at 476. The court found
it odd that the OHL would adopt a rule preventing a marquee player from entering its league after the commissioner said the addition of this player would be of
great benefit to the league. See id. at 476. The court also found that it was likely
the two leagues exchanged information and that the NHL wielded considerable
influence over the OHL. See id.
122. See id. ("The Van Ryn Rule, whether adopted by conspiracy between the
member clubs of the OHL or by conspiracy between the OHL and the NHL, does
not cause the anti-competitive effects alleged by Plaintiffs.").
123. See id. at 466, 476 (explaining reasons for dismissal and affirming district
court).
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SLAP SHOT, WRIST SHOT,

OR SLAP ON THE WRIST?

A.

The Rule of Reason Prevails

The court correctly applied the rule of reason instead of the
per se rule. 124 Both recent precedent and the rule of reason's appropriateness in antitrust cases involving professional sports leagues
support the rule of reason analysis. 125 The per se rule, as adopted
by the lower court in NHLPA II, is inapplicable because of the
unique circumstances of professional sports. 126 In this case, the
court was merely following the Supreme Court's holding in NCAA
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.12 7 Moreover, the
court's determination that the NHL's CBA applies, and that the
"Van Ryn Rule" does not, remains at the root of this interesting
28

case. 1

B.

A New Rule of Reason

Instead of the per se rule, the court applied the rule of reason
in NHLPA 1.129 The relevant questions in sports draft entry cases
are: (1) whether potentially drafted players are employees under
the NLRA; 130 (2) whether draft entry rules are mandatory subjects
124. See id. at 469 (holding that rule of reason was correct way to analyze
case).
125. See id. (applying rule of reason in NHL antitrust case because of recent
Supreme Court precedent following NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of
Oklahoma).
126. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86, 100-02
(1984) (noting that businesses which can only survive with horizontal restraints
must be analyzed under rule of reason because of their peculiar circumstances).
127. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 469 (holding sports leagues' antitrust activity
must be analyzed under rule of reason, not per se rule); see also Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. at 90, 103.
128. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 474 (refusing to determine whether "Van Ryn
Rule" harmed competition but notably ignoring that "Van Ryn Rule" effects potential NHL players who were not party to NHL's or OHL's rules and whose interests
were not represented by NHLPA).
129. See id. at 469 (noting per se analysis does not comport with recent Supreme Court precedent holding that some industries need horizontal restraints for
product availability).
130. See Gerba, supra note 41, at 2417 (positing that all future potential employees within NLRA definition would leave it limitless and asserting that if Congress intended such broad coverage it would have used term "person" instead of
.employee" when it espoused statute); see also 42 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1979) (defining
.employees" in ambiguous fashion).
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of bargaining; 13 1 and (3) whether the parties bargained for the

32
draft entry rule in good faith.
If courts accept the argument that potentially drafted players
are not employees under the NLRA, the per se rule applies when

analyzing draft entry into professional sports leagues. 3 3 If courts

accept that draft entry rules are not mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, the rule of reason would condemn this trade restraint.1 34 Therefore, the per se rule should apply in order to save
135
courts' precious time and resources.
C.

A Loophole Filled Without Collective Bargaining

An interesting dynamic exists between the harm to competition the NHL's CBA allegedly caused and the court's later
ruling on the conspiracy between the OHL and NHL. 13 6 Impliedly, the NHL could have put economic pressure on the OHL to
restrict competition using the "Van Ryn Rule."' 37 The court
found sufficient evidence to indicate that the NHL and
OHL conspired to restrict trade and that the NHL, leading the
OHL by the leash, initiated this conspiracy.' 3 8 Hence, the two
131. See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding rule limiting eligibility for NFL draft entry makes potential players unemployable, and
wages, hours, or working conditions affect only those who are employed or eligible
for employment); see also Gerba, supra note 41, at 2417. For a further discussion of
mandatory bargaining subjects and how courts inconsistently interpret such, see
supra notes 92, 106 and accompanying text.
132. See generally Gerba, supra note 41, at 2417 (eluding to third element in
analysis necessary in draft entry litigation).
133. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (noting that per se treatment of trade restraint is appropriate "once experience with particular kind of
restraint enables court to predict that rule of reason will condemn it" (quoting
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982)).
134. See id. (implying that if there is predetermined precedent that draft entry
rules are not mandatory subjects, court would not have to engage in rule of reason
analysis because it would be per se invalid to restrict trade in this fashion).
135. For a further discussion of fact-sensitive and time-consuming rule of reason inquiries, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
136. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 475-76 (6th Cir. 2005) (maintaining likelihood
of conspiracy between NHL and OHL to restrict competition because plaintiff
plead enough facts to support existence of agreement). The court held the plaintiffs could not prove a conspiracy between the NHL and OHL because the plaintiffs based their reasoning on the already discounted argument that the "Van Ryn
Rule" prevents players from achieving free agency. See id. at 476.
137. See id. at 474 (stating OHL's motives to restrict trade in this instance were
unnatural, though they clearly favored NHL by diminishing OHL's comparative
quality of athletic competition).
138. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 475-76 (outlining relationship between NHL
and OHL). The court explained:
To explain the NHL's ability to influence the OHL, Plaintiff detailed
their relationship: the NHL and OHL are affiliates under the CBA be-
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interrelated leagues launched a two-pronged assault to restrain
trade. 139
The first prong, the NHL CBA, defined drafted players' free
agency rights. 140 The second prong, the "Van Ryn Rule," restricted
1 41 Without
players' options of becoming free agent in the NHL.
the "Van Ryn Rule," the plaintiffs, through a loophole not contemplated by the NHL CBA's drafters and signers, would be unrestricted free agents. 142 With the "Van Ryn Rule," this avenue
toward NHL free agency closes. 143 As the court holds, the OHL is
144
an ancillary cause of the alleged restraint on trade.
tween the NHL and Plaintiff; the NHL provides coaches, scouting, club
management and player consultation services to the OHL; the NHL and
OHL have detailed rules allowing the loan and recall of players from the
OHL to the NHL; the OHL clubs provide rink advertising space to promote the NHL; and, the NHL makes substantial financial payments to the
OHL.
The record reveals that agreements between the NHL and the CHL
go back for more than forty years. The current agreement between the
NHL and the CHL provides significant benefits for each party. Among
such benefits are the following. The NHL makes substantial financial
payments to the CHL and funds various resources for the CHL players.
The NHL also cooperates in providing certain resources, where possible,
to CHL member clubs such as coaching, scouting, club management and
player consultation. The CHL provides the NHL with financial information regarding the operation of its member clubs. Rules exist for the loan
and recall of NHL players to and from the CHL. CHL games are played
according to NHL rules. NHL clubs at their opinion may undertake the
rehabilitation of injured CHL players. Each CHL club agrees to use its
best efforts to provide rink advertising space for the purpose of promoting the NHL.
NHLPA III, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1171 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
139. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 474 (examining relationship between NHL's
CBA and OHL's "Van Ryn Rule" and stating that "Van Ryn Rule" is merely secondary cause of trade restraint).
140. See NHL CBA, supra note 116, at Art. 10 (denoting who is free agent in
NHL by various rules and procedures).
141. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467 (noting that "Van Ryn Rule" prohibited
players from becoming unrestricted free agents by quashing players' abilities to
gain free agency when they join leagues affiliated with NHL).
142. See id. (describing effects of "Van Ryn Rule"). This, ironically, is why the
"Van Ryn Rule" is called the "Van Ryn Rule," because Mike Van Ryn was able to
circumvent the system through a loophole. See id. The alleged conspiracy between
the NHL and OHL closed the loophole, not the efforts of the NHL and NHLPA
through collective bargaining. See id. For a further discussion of the "Van Ryn
Rule," see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
143. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467 (explaining that NHL's CBA governs
league eligibility). The court failed to note the repercussions of the OHL's unilateral modification of the CBA by the "Van Ryn Rule." See id.
144. See id. at 474 (denoting conspiracy between two leagues). This argument
may also implicate the NCAA because the "Van Ryn Rule," combined with the
NCAA policy of not allowing amateurs to hold professional credentials, is really
what makes the NHL's restraint on trade work. See id. at 466. The NCAA, how-
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IMPOSE ON NON-

EMPLOYEES UNILATERAL RESTRAINTS ON NON-MANDATORY
BARGAINING TERMS AND NEGOTIATE IN BAD FAITH

A.

Who to Sue?

Despite the court's indications, the plaintiffs may have a cause
of action against the NHL under the Sherman Act. 145 The court
incorrectly examined the balance between labor law and antitrust
law when it noted that the NLE prevents the plaintiffs from having
a cause of action against the NHL. 146 The court erred in stating the
plaintiffs would have no claim under the Sherman Act because the
trade restriction was enacted under the NHL CBA-the NHL and
14 7
NHLPA did not bargain over this particular aspect of the CBA.
The co-plaintiffs in this case are the NHLPA, Aquino, and
Caron. 1 48 Aquino and Caron, at the time they filed their complaint, were NCAA hockey players and not professionals. 149 Under
a broad reading of the NLRA's definition of employee, they were
not employees of the NHL. 150 The NLRA definition makes no reference to individuals who are not employees. 15 1 Therefore, the
ever, was not implicated in the conspiracy suit; additionally, there are no objective
facts or facts in the record which support their policy as being motivated by an
agreement with the NHL. See id.
145. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding there was
not bona-fide, arm's-length bargaining because rule predated CBA and there was
no quid pro quo for its inclusion in CBA).
146. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 474-75 (adding that defendant OHL bears no
responsibility for NHL CBA). The court wrote rather briefly on the complicated
issue of the NLE, citing only Clarett II. See id. at 474. This short writing on the
matter of whether the plaintiffs could sue the NHL could be viewed as the court
trying to prevent further litigation in the case or simply as an indication of how it
would rule in the future. See id.
147. See id. (dictating court's view on complex NLE issue that CBA, not "Van
Ryn Rule," caused injury alleged by NHLPA and thus precluding cause of action
under Sherman Act); see also Gerba, supra note 41, at 2411-17 (arguing entry rule is
not mandatory subject of collective bargaining and potential player in professional
sports league is not considered employee, meaning NLE is inapplicable). This
case is similar to ClarettH because the two plaintiffs, like Clarett, are potential, and
not actual, employees of the NHL. See id. at 2417. Also, the draft entry rules found
in the NHL CBA do not deal with mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
NLRA, unless interpreted liberally. See id.
148. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467-68 (identifying plaintiffs and defendants).
149. See id. at 467 (explaining relative positions of plaintiffs at time action
commenced).
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (defining "employees"); see also McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 89, at 402-04 (highlighting Supreme Court's analysis
of term "employee"); Gerba, supra note 41, at 2416-17 (noting NLRA imposes limits on whom to consider "employee").
151. See Gerba, supra note 41, at 2416 (recognizing limits on whom to consider "employee"). The author notes:
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plaintiffs were outside of the bargaining unit and the NHL's CBA
15 3
does not apply to them. 152 This fails Mackey's first prong.
Nevertheless, a sensitive issue comes to light because the
NHLPA was also a co-plaintiff. 154 The NHL may argue the NHLPA,
as the sole bargaining representative for all NHL players, is charged
with bargaining on behalf of the NHL's employees. 15 5 Thus, as an
alternative, the NHLPA can bargain for a less restrictive CBA when
dealing with draft eligibility rights for potential free agents, rather
156
than simply suing the NHL.
In an antitrust case against the NHLPA, however, the NHL's
argument is irrelevant because the NHL and the NHLPA never specifically bargained on the "Van Ryn Rule."1 57 An arm's-length, collectively bargained agreement must produce an actual agreement
in order to have the NLE applied. 158 Moreover, the NLRA's purThe definition goes on to use the term "any individual," which applies to
people "whose work has ceased." This, at least implicitly, requires that
the person must have already been an employee ....

To effectuate the

congressional intent for collective bargaining, the NLRA must cover
some potential employees to foster incentives for employers to bargain
collectively. The NLRA definition, however, imposes limits on who
should be considered an employee. Including all future potential employees within this definition would leave the definition of "employees"
virtually limitless.
Id. at 2416-17 (citations omitted).
152. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (" [T]he labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship.").
153. See id. at 615 (espousing first prong of three part test for NLE).
154. See NHLPA I1, 419 F.3d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting parties to case).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (acknowledging NLRA promotes its goals "by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.") (emphasis added); see also Diamos,
supra note 2 (outlining belief that NHLPA is nothing more than organ for NHL).
156. Cf ClarettL,306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that if NLE
is inapplicable, it would undermine federal labor policy). In this case, federal labor policy would not be undermined because the petitioners did not challenge the
CBA, but rather they challenged a unilateral amendment to the CBA that was conspiratorially achieved after the two parties bargained for a system. See NHLPA II,
419 F.3d at 475-76 ("Plaintiffs . . . failed to allege facts sufficient to support the
existence of an agreement ....

This conclusion is based on our analysis of the

allegations in the complaint relating to each of the factors to be considered in
weighing circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy.")
157. See NHLPA 1, 419 F.3d at 467 ("These factual allegations, if believed,
could support a finding that the NHL and OHL conspired to implement the Van
Ryn Rule.").

158. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616 (espousing standard to determine applicability of NLE in litigation).
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159
pose is to encourage labor peace through collective bargaining.
Therefore, because the "Van Ryn Rule" did not stem from collective
bargaining and unlawfully 'restricts trade under the Sherman Act
when combined with the NHL's CBA, the NHLPA and the players
160
may have a cause of action against the NHL.
Yet, if the court disagrees, as its dicta indicates, the decision
confronting the plaintiffs will be difficult.16 ' If the plaintiffs sue the
NHL, the court will apply the NLE and will likely implicitly hold
that the two players are NFL employees. 162 Thus, the first prong of
the Mackey test would be satisfied.' 63 If Aquino and Caron break off
from the NHLPA, the suit will likely be dropped because the two
players have moved on in their careers; 164 only the NHLPA has a

159. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (noting purpose of NLRA). The NLRA further
announces:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
Id. The NHL's actions here did not promote industrial peace because no collective bargaining took place, and as made obvious by the NHLPA's suit, the NHLPA
was not happy with the NHL's unilateral restraint imposed through conspiratorial
means. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 467 (stating OHL unilaterally adopted "Van Ryn
Rule" in response to Mike Van Ryn's ability to achieve free agency).
160. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (illustrating that agreement must fulfill three
part test). Cf Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding that
employers may unilaterally impose terms on employees, but only after two sides
tried to reach good faith agreement on those terms, which did not occur in this
case).
161. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 474 ("Any anti-competitive effect of a properly
bargained collective bargaining agreement is excluded from antitrust scrutiny by a
nonstatutory antitrust exemption.").
162. See id. at 475 (explaining dicta of likely result if plaintiffs sued NHL).
The court further elaborated:
However, we must still consider whether the "Van Ryn Rule" can
fairly be said to be the cause of this injury. Defendants argue that the
alleged effects of the Van Ryn Rule are actually caused not by the Rule
but by the NHL's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), which sets
forth the rules governing eligibility for free agency. Any anti-competitive
effect of a properly bargained collective bargaining agreement is excluded from antitrust scrutiny by a non-statutory antitrust exemption.
Id. at 474.
163. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (holding that plaintiff must be party to collectively bargained agreement in order for NLE to apply).
164. See Guth, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that both co-plaintiffs are current
NHL players).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol14/iss1/1

28

Brophy: Icing the Competition: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption and the C

2007]

NHLPA v. PLYMOUTH WHALERS HocKEY CLUB

29

current interest in this case. 165 In hindsight, the plaintiffs would
166
have a valid argument if they sued the NHL and not the OHL.
B.

Entry to a Professional Sports League is Not a Mandatory
Bargaining Subject

It is important to note that an agreement to restrict admission
to a profession is not intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions.1 67 Matters that concern persons outside of the bargaining agreement are permissive, not mandatory, subjects of
169
bargaining. 16 8 This case's plaintiffs are not NHL employees.
They are not parties to the agreement, and the CBA affects them as
entities outside the agreement. 7 0 Hence, entry to a professional
165. See generally NHL CBA, supra note 116, at Art. 10 (discerning implicitly,
because of NHLPA's bargaining position, that NHLPA cares more about NHL's
rules than Acquino and Caron, who have moved on in their professional careers).
If the NHLPA were in fact so against the "Van Ryn Rule," it should not have agreed
in the new NHL CBA, ratified in July, 2005, to the same free agency terms. See id.
166. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 475 (stating that NHL, not OHL, is liable to
plaintiffs for harm). Cf Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (denoting that all three prongs of
test must be met for NLE to apply).
167. For a further discussion on the NLE's constraints, see supra notes 52-65
and accompanying text. The Second Circuit in Clarett II found the eligibility requirement had tangible effects on wages and working conditions. See Clarett II, 369
F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004). In support of this, the court stated the "[eligibility
rule's] elimination might well alter certain assumptions underlying the collective
bargaining agreement between the NFL and its players union." Id. The court continued: "[b]ecause the size of NFL teams is capped, the eligibility rules diminish a
veteran player's risk of being replaced by either a drafted rookie or a player who
enters the draft and, though not drafted, is then hired as a rookie free agent." Id.
An examination of these two assertions shows that neither supports classification as
a mandatory subject, and thus they cannot support the application of the NLE to
Clarett's case. See id.
168. See McCormick & McKinnon, supranote 89, at 407. The authors explain:
The draft eligibility rule concerns the relationship between the employing clubs and persons outside the collective bargaining relationship without vitally affecting active players. In addition, the interests of
prospective players and active players regarding the rule conflict. As a
result, the draft eligibility rule does not come within the exception to the
rule that matters involving persons outside the employment relationship
are permissive rather than mandatory subjects of bargaining. Being a
non-mandatory subject, the eligibility rule fails the second prong of the
Mackey-McCourt standard, and consequently, should not be immunized
from antitrust interdiction.
Id.
169. For a further discussion of whether the plaintiffs are "employees" under
the NLRA, see supra notes 62, 89, 91, and 151.
170. For a further discussion explaining who are considered employees under
the NLRA, see supra notes 62, 89, 91, and 151. Further, the NHLPA did not represent the two plaintiffs in negotiations about an entry rule to the NHL because
they were not part of the NHLPA at that time. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d at 475.
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sports league is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 171
Therefore, the Connell Construction test, Jewel Tea test, and the sec172
ond prong of the Mackey test all fail.
The policy reasons for upholding a professional sport organiza173
tion's CBA do not truly shed any light on the players' claims.
Unlike the Supreme Court's most recent holding in Brown, which
174
dealt with wages and employees, this case deals with neither.
1 75
Thus, the NLE should be inapplicable.
C.

Was the NHL's New CBA Negotiated in Bad Faith?

Furthermore, as recent history suggests, the bargaining for the
new NHL CBA may not have been fair and equal.' 76 The weak
171. For a further discussion of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
see supra notes 68-73, 106 and accompanying text.
172. For a further discussion of the case law pertaining to mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining and tests established to determine if the NLE applies, see
supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
173. For a further discussion about how the Clarett II court's holding viewed
Brown's holding as not openly supporting Mackey but rather as noting the broad
need for antitrust law to cooperate with labor law, see supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
174. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (noting unilateral imposition of terms unquestionably dealt with employees and mandatory bargaining terms). For a further discussion of the Court's holding in Brown, see supra
note 100.
175. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (noting workers were employees and restraint
dealt with unilateral imposition of mandatory terms). For a further discussion of
how the new NHL CBA may be the product of a bad faith negotiation, see infra
notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
176. SeeJamie Fitzpatrick, Hockey Quotes: The End of the NHL Lockout, http://
(last visproicehockey.about.com/od/thelatestonthelockout/a/cba-quotes.htm
ited Sept. 16, 2006). The author quotes several hockey players, among them goaltender Sean Burke:
"I don't think the deal that we're going to get would have been ratified
last summer. But Ijust think we've been worn down to the point where at
this stage the deal would really have to be incredibly bad for the guys not
to vote it in. At least that's the sense I'm getting."
Id. (quoting Sean Burke); see also Diamos, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting Marvin
Miller, former executive director of Major League Baseball Players Association, on
new NHL CBA). The article reads:
Miller pointed to the players union's eventual willingness to accept a salary cap and to Ted Saskin's controversial ascension to executive director
of the union (he replaced Bob Goodenow). Saskin had been the union's
senior director of business affairs and licensing. "The whole thing smells
bad," Miller said. "Itjust has a very bad odor. You have a so-called senior
adviser who takes the leading role in making one of the worst settlements
imaginable and then becomes executive director of the union." Of the
salary cap, Miller said: "I don't think it was necessary. All the signs were
that the union, having come that far, they had more than a fighter's
chance of prevailing. And when the tide turns like that, I get very suspicious of management's role in coercing the membership."
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union fired its head negotiator and accepted a deal far below what
they had hoped for. 177 Perhaps as a case in point, the NHLPA al17 8
lowed the free agency rules to remain the same in the new CBA.
The NLRB and the courts expounded the necessity to bargain
in good faith to enable unions who could not strike to maintain a
satisfactory bargaining status. 179 Nevertheless, it is difficult to prove
bad faith on the part of a bargaining entity because the court is not
allowed to inquire into the terms of an agreement. 80 In a recently
filed lawsuit that is extremely relevant to the facts of this case, certain members of the NHLPA have asked to remove the NHLPA's
head negotiator and reward them millions of dollars in damages,
part of which stem from the alleged misrepresentations made to
18 1
players during their ratification of the 2005 CBA.
The NHL may not have bargained in good faith with the
NHLPA. 18 2 The NHLPA and the NHL bargained for the NHL CBA
but did not bargain for the "Van Ryn Rule," which was part of the
two-pronged restraint of trade. 18 3 Therefore, the NHL, conspiring
with the OHL, unilaterally changed a mandatory bargaining term

177. See generally Caldwell, supranote 11 (noting players not happy with union
head after agreement). "I think the deal is not great for the players .... It is
definitely an owner-friendly deal." Id. (quoting Philadelphia Flyers center Jeremy
Roenick).
178. See CBA Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/
index.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (noting free agency rules in new CBA are
unchanged from previous CBA). This may explain the motive for the NHLPA to
sue the OHL, rather than the NHL, in this case. See id. Or, perhaps, it shows that
the NHLPA was truly weakened by a strike that cost it an entire hockey season. For
a further discussion of this issue, see supra notes 140, 176-77 and accompanying
text.
179. See 25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d § 333 (2006) (illustrating how "good
faith" is hard to define in labor context).
180. See id. (mentioning Catch-22 in proving bad faith in labor context). For
a further discussion about how the McCourt case demonstrated the tough standard
of proof when dealing with bad faith agreements in the professional sports context, see supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
181. See Ken Campbell, Lawsuit Alleges Goodenow Received $8 Million Buyout,
http://www.thehockeynews.com/en/news/news.asp?idNews=21919 (last visited
October 28, 2006) (denoting allegations of certain players against NHLPA).
182. For a further discussion of good faith in the context of labor negotiations between a union and an employer, see supra note 179.
183. For a further discussion of the NHL's and OHL's two pronged restraint
of trade, see supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
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and, consequently, acted in bad faith. 18 4 Even though it is unlikely,
18 5
this case may fail the third prong of the Mackey test.
VII.

CONCLUSION: A SHOOT OUT THAT ENDS WITH AN
OWNER'S VICTORY

186
The Supreme Court has never fully developed the NLE.
Therefore, in the complex labor world of professional sports, courts
can use the NLE as a shield to employees' interests, or courts can
87
use it incorrectly because of the oftentimes conflicting case law.1
In this case, the plaintiffs sued the wrong entity. 1 88 If they sued the
NHL, it appears the court would have wrongfully granted the
NLE. 18 9 The new NHL CBA, if analyzed from a player's point of
view, may not have been the product of a fair negotiation. 190 The
Supreme Court may have to confront this issue in an antitrust suit
in the future. Both the complex issues and the conflicting case law
meant to solve the problems present daunting challenges to courts.
Courts can solve their problems with draft entry rules by declaring them per se violations of the Sherman Act. This can be
practically accomplished if courts hold that potential draftees are
not employees under the NLRA or that draft entry rules are not
mandatory bargaining subjects. 19 1 Recently, however, the courts

184. See NHLPA II, 419 F.3d 462, 466-68 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting facts of case).
This results only if the court finds that it is a mandatory term of bargaining, which,
as this Comment argues, it is not. For a further discussion of why this is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, see supra notes 92, 106. See generally Local Joint
Executive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union Local 226 v. NLRB., 309
F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting employer violated obligations of good faith if it
unilaterally imposes changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(d) (referencing requirement of good faith in collective bargaining).
185. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding NLE inapplicable if agreement is not part of bona-fide, arm's-length negotiation).
186. For a further discussion on the Court's different holdings on antitrust
issues involving the NLE, see supra notes 66-107 and accompanying text.
187. See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (using NLE even though
Mackey test not fulfilled); see also Kessler & Feher, supra note 6, at 45 ("The lesson
of history, from both before and after the Brown decision, is that disruptions between players and owners, with less collective bargaining, are more likely to occur
now than ever before-undermining the very labor law policies thatJustice Breyer
indicated he was trying to protect in Brown.").
188. For a further discussion on whether the NHLPA should have sued the
NHL rather than the OHL, see supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
189. See NHLPA II, 318 F.3d 462, 474 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Any anti-competitive
effect of a properly bargained collective bargaining agreement is excluded from
antitrust scrutiny by a nonstatutory antitrust exemption.").
190. For a further discussion on the player's point of view regarding the new
CBA, see supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
191. For a further discussion on why the per se rule should be applied in the
context of the draft entry rule, see supra notes 179-80.
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have put the team concept of a CBA over the individual rights of a
player trying to penetrate the impenetrable structure of "free"
agency in professional sports. 19 2 The strategy of placing the collective over the individual has served the New Jersey Devils well in the
past, but it remains to be seen whether the courts will continue to
193
stress this ideal.
Thomas Brophy
192. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1995) (holding unilateral imposition of fixed salary fell within scope of NLE); Clarelt II, 369 F.3d at 140
(holding NLE applies to agreements unilaterally imposed and not bargained for
collectively). In an ironic counterpoint, the New Jersey Devils also put the team
above the individual and have had success. For a further discussion on this team
concept, see supra note 1 and accompanying text. However, the Devils have had
numerous problems with players concerning contracts. This is an interesting parallel to the NLRA's main policy goal of promoting industrial peace: if the Devils'
policy causes bickering over player contracts, how will NHL players react to the
new NHL CBA? For a further discussion on how the "Van Ryn Rule" came about
because of the Devils' hard bargaining position, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
193. For a further discussion of the Devils' championship teams and how they
were built as a metaphor for courts' analysis of labor law and antitrust law, see
supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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